governments and co-governing institutions establishing the structural set-up for consensual policy-making in Germany. However, what about the Länder? Obviously, they can hardly be tied down by the same 'formal or informal checks and balances' as the national Goliath.
In the Länder there are neither second chambers like the federal council nor constitutional courts enjoying the same or similar competencies as the federal constitutional court at the national level (Reutter 2017) . What does this mean for constitutional politics in the Länder?
In this article, I will try to find answers to these questions and examine how far constitutional politics in the East German Länder confirm the assumption that Germany is a Grand Coalition state and whether consensus democracy has effectively operated at this level and in this policy-field, as well. In methodological terms constitutional politics of the five new Länder seem to be ideal to tackle the questions at hand and to examine whether policy-making in this sector shares features complying with functional principles of German consensus democracy. East German Länder and their constitutions shared similar initial conditions as far as this policy sector were concerned. After joining the FRG they all had to establish a new system and adopt a new constitution (Lorenz 2013) . Hence, my study tries to shed some light on the assumption that the functioning principles of the works in a sector that is supposed to notably represent the autonomy of the Länder.
In order to address issues linked to the theory of the Grand Coalition state I will analyse two crucial elements of German consensus democracy as far as these pertain to sub-national constitutional politics. I will firstly explore how the federal system or the vertical division of tasks between the national and the sub-national level impacts on this policy sector. As far as the Grand-Coalition-state hypothesis is concerned this is a crucial dimension because policy-making has been shaped by the functional principles of cooperative federalism in many sectors (Schmidt 2008: 79 ff.) . I will explore how far these principles also apply with regard to sub-national constitutional politics. In a second step, I
examine if and in what respect constitutional politics in eastern Germany fit with the aforementioned logic of consensus democracy. As any amendment to an East German constitution requires a two-thirds majority in parliament it might plausibly be assumed that they also strengthen the Grand Coalition component at the Länder level.
German political scientists have only recently begun to examine sub-national constitutional politics (Reutter 2008; Lorenz/Reutter 2012; Flick 2008a; Hölscheidt 1995; Reutter/Lorenz 2015) . Yet, none of these studies explores constitutional politics in the five new Länder in an encompassing way and in the perspective laid out above (Jesse et al. 2014: 51-68; Gunlicks 2003: 141-62; Lorenz 2011) . In addition, the prevailing research mainly focuses on the question of whether and how far constitutional rigidity affected the number of amendments to German Land constitutions (Flick 2008a) . However, in order to capture constitutional politics I do not only have to include adopted amendments into the analysis but all drafted bills that aimed at changing East German constitutions.
II

Cooperative federalism, sub-national constitutional politics and the Grand Coalition state
German federalism splits sovereignty between the federation and the Länder in a specific fashion. Most importantly, the division of competencies between the federation and the Länder makes cooperation and intertwined policy-making obligatory. The separation of tasks therefore causes a 'network-like system of interlocking politics' in which each participant enjoys 'veto power of considerable strength' (Schmidt 2008: 80 and 81) . 
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These structures seemingly privilege co-operation among Land executives and bargaining as a major mode of conflict resolution as well as privilege unitarian and homogeneous policies. In a nutshell this is the textbook interpretation of German federalism and a core element of the Grand Coalition state (Kropp 2010; Laufer/Münch 2010).
Seemingly, sub-national constitutional politics fits perfectly with this understanding for two reasons: On the one hand, the people in the Länder are not sovereign and sub-national constitutions are not merely an expression of decisions made by the demoi of the Länder.
They are part of a federal state and thus have to comply with provisions laid down in the federal constitution. In order to make sure that the sub-national constitutions are in line with the federal order the Basic Law circumscribes the Länder's competencies in this area (Lorenz/Reutter 2012; Gunlicks 2012) . Art. 28 par. 1 of the German Basic Law (BL) requires Land constitutions to conform to the principles of a republican, democratic and social state governed by the rule of law within the meaning of the Basic Law. Due to this 'homogeneity clause' many scholars see Land constitutions 'overshadowed by the Basic Law' (Möstl 2005) . In this dominating perspective the BL allots constitutional space to the Länder, enclose Land constitutions and overrules regulations contradicting the BL (like the existing death penalty in the constitution of Hesse). On the other hand, ideas seem to travel easily between the German Länder. C. Pestalozza (2014a) for example claims that there is a tendency towards standardised sub-national constitutions in Germany sometimes based on consultation, sometimes on imitation. Many scholars see sub-national constitutions, therefore, not only shaped by the national level but also by processes of adaptation and homogenisation which could eventually even jeopardise a crucial precondition of federalism: diversity (Pestalozza 2014a; Dombert 2012; Stiens 1997 (Flick 2008a; Lorenz 2013 ). All East German Land constitutions establish a parliamentary system which is complemented by elements of direct democracy, the latter playing only a minor role so far, though (Flick 2008b: 170-85; Reutter 2008: 193-204; Eder/Magin 2008 Source: My compilation based on the data retrieved from the websites of the Land parliaments.
There are similar patterns with regard to the number of bills submitted to the East Overall, we can conclude that the federal system works in a specific way with regard to sub-national constitutional politics. In this policy-sector German federalism seems dual rather than cooperative in character and neither based on cooperation nor on intertwined policy-making. This provides the institutional premise for heterogeneous policies and independent politics in the Länder and in this domain. In this respect the functioning principles of the Grand Coalition state can, hence, hardly impact on sub-national constitutional politics. In short: With regard to constitutional politics, the functioning principles of the Grand Coalition State did not effectively operate in the five new Länder.
They did not shape policy-making in this area. However, there is still the second argument to be tackled with, and that is that two-thirds majorities strengthen the Grand Coalition state.
Constitutional politics, the Grand Coalition state and the parliamentary form of government
As pointed out, many assume constitutional politics to be different from 'normal' lawmaking. Obviously, this is due to the fact that in this policy sector ruling parties and parties in opposition have to find a consensus to muster the supermajority required for an amendment.
VII In other words the parliamentary form of government is supposed to be suspended and replaced by policy-making based on consensus and compromise. My analysis will partly confirm this view, but I will also challenge the assumption that constitutional politics can only be understood as a manifestation of the German Grand Coalition state or consensus democracy for two reasons. On the one hand consensus democracy focuses on adopted amendments, i.e., on that 'face of power' that led to formal change. VIII However, I find such a perspective too narrow and biased to fully capture subnational constitutional politics. I, therefore, also include bills rejected by parliaments. On the other hand, I will argue that constitutional politics in the new Länder partly comply with the logic of the parliamentary form of government and majoritarian democracy.
In order to compare normal law-making with law-making pertaining to constitutional change I construct two ideal types. Theoretically, in a parliamentary democracy the executive branch is legitimised and eventually held to account by a majority in parliament. Table 5 summarises these features taking Michael Mezey's concept as a template: X As tables 5 and 6 reveal there are similarities, but also some differences between consensual and majoritarian law-making. without parties in opposition supporting the initiative from the beginning. Both bills have been enacted, though. In these cases, the consensus was formed during the legislative process.
If need be, in all East German
XII This finding supports the aforementioned view that constitutional politics are not based on intertwined policy-making. Perhaps even more importantly, this policy sector seems to rank rather low on the agenda of Land governments. Ruling parties and governments rarely took the initiative in the German Länder and submitted only few bills in this policy sector. This statement applies to parties in opposition as well as to ruling parties. In all five Länder only ten out of a hundred bills were introduced by more than one party. Of these ten bills parties in opposition jointly introduced two proposals, XIV ruling parties submitted two, as well XV and six bills were introduced by parties in power and in opposition. XVI We find the same pattern in 'normal' law-making, where only few proposals were mutually submitted by more than one party in parliament. At least in Brandenburg, Saxony, and Thuringia between 80 and 90 % of all bills were submitted by one party or the governments (table 6) .
As far as constitutional politics are concerned, amendments submitted jointly by parties in power and in oppositions were all enacted.
Constitutional politics in the East German Länder -Some Tentative Conclusions
Is Germany a Grand Coalition state also in the Länder? And does sub-national constitutional politics strengthen consensus democracy as they do at the national level?
These were the questions I have tried to provide answers to. I should emphasise, though, E -40 consensus democracy in general. I focused on the sub-national level which is not included in the concepts in question. Hence, I can hardly falsify or verify hypotheses that theories never claimed to make in the first place. Yet, by examining constitutional politics in the five new Länder I still tried to shed some light on a few blind spots these theories never took into account and thus to better understand how majoritarian and consensus democracy are linked to each other at least in the policy sector in question. One of my major conclusions is that these concepts are not at all mutually exclusive. On the contrary, as far as constitutional politics are concerned both components operate in the same policy sector.
Thus the 'unique combination of majoritarian and consensus democracy' (Schmidt 2008: 87) typical for the German Grand Coalition state shaped a policy sector that many take as a prime example for consensus democracy.
Furthermore, I could bring to the fore that many features usually associated with German cooperative federalism and the Grand Coalition state seemingly cannot explain politics and policies in this domain. Even though it goes without saying that German federalism and the national constitution impacted on constitutional politics in the German
Länder there was no indication whatsoever on intertwined policy-making or on executive networks providing governments further leverage in this field. On the contrary, in constitutional politics I found a federal system in place in which decisions are made autonomously at the Länder level. I could find no evidence that would support the assumption that joint decision-making, cooperation among Länder executives or multi-level strategies of parties had any impact in this sector. In essence, parties made different proposals in different Länder, did not coordinate the strategies across Länder, and defined their roles in the parliaments according to regional needs. My findings rather support Arthur Benz's assumption that federalism is a dynamic and flexible system that works differently in different policy sectors (Benz 1985; Jeffer et al. 2014) . In other words, we still have to find a way how to causally link the impact of a multilevel system with subnational politics in different policy areas (Reutter 2014).
Finally, if the institutional set-up for cooperation cannot be referred to in the same way as at the national level to explain consensus and compromise in the Länder, we have to look for other factors. Our analysis indicates that if we take both 'faces of power' into consideration -that is not only the adopted amendments but also those rejected by parliaments -we might find constitutional politics closer to 'normal' politics than many II If not otherwise indicated I retrieved the information on introduced bills and adopted amendments from the websites of the Land parliaments. Even though the access to these websites differ in detail, I proceeded in principle as follows: I searched the respective websites by looking for 'bills' (Dokumenttyp: Gesetzentwurf) on the subject 'Landesverfassung'. Then I checked all entries for relevance and for the data we needed. III In its final part the constitution of Brandenburg addresses issues such as: the constitutional court (Art. 114), how a new constitution is to be adopted (Art. 115), a possible amalgamation of the Land with another Land, and when the constitution comes into effect (Art. 117). The respective articles in the constitution of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania (Art. 78-80) rule: that each pupil will get a copy of the constitution on the first day at school, that texts in official documents will include both the male and the female form, that from 2012 onwards the budget has to be set up in such a way that in 2020 the debt brake will come into effect, and the day when the constitution comes into effect. IV I compare constitutional policies by using formal characteristics like the number of articles or bills.
Comparing constitutions in such a way runs into a number of problems, though. For example, the content of provisions can vary even if these have the same number of articles or words. Furthermore, stipulations addressing the same issue might figure in different chapters of a constitution. For instance, in the constitution of Saxony the parts on the 'Foundation of the State' (Grundlagen des Staates) include provisions on social rights, state goals (Staatsziele), or on communal life (Gemeinschaftsleben). In contrast, Brandenburg's constitution includes a separate chapter on these issues. Or: Chapters on the judiciary not only include provisions on this state function but also on state organs. In order to avoid such problems of assignment we subsumed all articles of a constitution under four headings (table 1) . V Between 1992 and 2014 each elected parliament of the five new Länder existed some 22 years, i.e. in sum 110 years. In this period 100 amendments had been submitted to the five parliaments, thus on average 0.9 bills had to be dealt with per year. Furthermore, until the end of 2014 28 parliamentary elections had been taken place, which means that on average each elected parliament passed 0.6 constitutional amendments. VI We find similar patterns with regard to the question of whether the debt brake should be included in Land constitutions. In some Länder the CDU, SPD and the Green Party supported such a policy while they opposed it in other Länder; see: Sturm 2011. VII So far four coalitions could rely on a two-thirds majority in East German parliaments: there were three coalitions including the SPD and the CDU in Brandenburg (1999 Brandenburg ( -2004 , Mecklenburg-West Pomerania (1994 -1998 and Thuringia (1994 Thuringia ( -1999 ; in addition one coalition composed of SPD and PDS (1994-1998) had a majority in parliament of 66.2 percent. VIII I gleaned this concept from Bachrach/Baratz 1962. IX As far as law-making in general is concerned we have respective data for only three East German Länder. For overviews on Land parliaments and law-making see Reutter 2013: 63-71; Ismayr 2008: 383-429; Reutter 2008: 230-256 . X It should be noted, though, that Michael Mezey asks a different question and compares legislatures, hence, not different types of legislative decision-making; Mezey 1979. XI Landtag Thüringen, Drs. 3/2237 (28.02.2002 ) and Drs. 4/4969 (12.03.2009 Landtag Brandenburg, Drs. 2/678 (27.04.1995), and Drs. 3/7444 (28.04.2004 ). XII These amendments had the debt brake included in the constitution of Mecklenburg-West Pomerania and reorganised the remuneration for parliamentarians in Thuringia; Landtag Mecklenburg-Vorpommern, Drs. 5/4192 (2.3.2011); Landtag Thüringen, Drs. 2/2381 (6.11.1997 . XIII Landtag Brandenburg, Drs. 2/3657 (16.01.1997 ), 2/3658 (16.011997), and 5/1880 (25.08.2010 . XIV Landtag Brandenburg Drs. 5/2045 (23.09.2010 ), Landtag Thüringen Drs. 3/1911 (24.10.2001 . XV Landtag Thüringen Drs. 2381 (6.11.1997 ), Landtag Mecklenburg-Vorpommern Drs. 5/4192 (2.3.2011 .
